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Via Electric Filing 
Secretary Donald S. Clark 
United States Federal Trade Commission 
Oﬃce of the Secretary 
600 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW 
Washington, DC 20580 
Re: CAN-SPAM Rule Review, 16 C.F.R. Part 316, Project No. R711010 
Dear Secretary Clark: 
I write in response to the Commission’s request for public comment on the 
CAN-SPAM Rule, 16 C.F.R. Part 316. I am an Associate Professor of Law at the 
University of New Hampshire School of Law and Faculty Fellow at the Franklin 
Pierce Center for Intellectual Property. I teach and write about privacy, intellectual 
property, internet law, and other areas at the intersection of law and technology. 
Among my scholarship in these areas is Preemption of State Spam Laws by the Federal 
CAN-SPAM Act, Comment, 72 U. Chi. L. Rev. 355 (2005), which was one of the first 
scholarly works to analyze the CAN-SPAM Act. I submit these comments in my 
personal capacity. 
The CAN-SPAM Act set a minimum baseline for consumer protections that 
senders of unsolicited commercial email must respect. These protections have been 
largely eﬀective at giving consumers the ability to manage how a large group of 
companies uses their email addresses for marketing. At the same time, the Act has had 
little eﬀect on the volume of unsolicited commercial email or on the amount of email 
sent by scammers and fraudsters. The Act and its implementing Rule, then, have been 
neither the success they should be nor the failure that critics describe. 
The Commission should adjust the Rule to maintain its substantial consumer 
benefits while addressing its shortcomings. By leaving in place the significant 
consumer protections the Rule provides while updating and tweaking their substance 
to provide additional protections and account for technological change since the Rule 
was promulgated, the Commission would best implement the goals and structure of 
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the Act. Moreover, the Commission should look for additional ways, within its 
authority under the Act and other statutes, to address the problem of scam emails. 
The Can-Spam Act is neither the success it should be nor 
the failure its critics describe. 
Congress enacted the CAN-SPAM Act in 2003 to address two problems. As the 
Internet grew into a part of everyday life, unsolicited commercial email, or spam, 
made up an increasing share of email traﬃc, amounting to more than half of all emails 
sent and clogging inboxes around the world. At the same time, growing state eﬀorts to 
address the problem threatened to hinder email’s usefulness as a tool of commerce by 
making it diﬃcult and expensive to comply with fifty diﬀerent state laws. By setting a 
uniform baseline level of consumer protections with which companies sending 
commercial email must comply, the Act aimed to reduce the volume of spam and give 
consumers tools to control the amount of spam they receive. 
It did not work out as Congress intended. The CAN-SPAM Act did not 
eliminate or even significantly reduce spam, which still accounts for more than half of 
email traﬃc. And though the Act did create a uniform baseline level of consumer 
protections, many senders ignore those protections. Even when companies do obey 
the Act, its rules have proven insuﬃcient to reduce the costs that spam imposes on 
recipients. The Act, then, has not been the success it should be. 
At the same time, the Act has successfully defined the rules of the road for 
legitimate senders of commercial email—a role that should not be ignored. Before the 
Act, email users had no legal right to control their own email inboxes; a company 
could send unlimited commercial email, without consent, and face no legal 
consequences or constraints. It could purchase or build a list of addresses, send them 
as many emails as it felt like, decline to oﬀer any option to opt in or out of receiving 
emails, and refuse to provide any way to get in touch with the sender, all without any 
accountability for its choices. After the Act, senders must disclose their name and 
address, oﬀer a way to opt out of receiving further messages, and label messages 
containing adult content. These are valuable consumer protections. 
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There are two kinds of spammers: Legitimate companies that 
generally comply with the law and illegitimate scammers 
that are unlikely to comply no matter the Rule’s content. 
The key to understanding the Act’s mixed eﬀects, and building on its successes 
while addressing its shortcomings, is to understand that not all unsolicited commercial 
email is the same. Instead of one unified market of spammers, there are diﬀerent kinds 
of companies sending diﬀerent kinds of unsolicited commercial email. Some of these 
companies are legitimate businesses that generally comply with the law; with these 
companies, adjustments to the Rule are likely to aﬀect consumers, for good or ill. 
Other companies that send commercial email are illegitimate scammers that are 
unlikely to comply with the Act no matter what it says; with these companies, other 
approaches are needed. 
The first category, legitimate companies that generally comply with the law, 
includes many companies and groups using email as part of their marketing strategies. 
Most of these companies use email for marketing in ways that would not be recognized 
as classic spamming. Few legitimate companies send email indiscriminately to every 
email address they can get their hands on, since doing so might oﬀend customers and 
would quickly get them blacklisted by email services. Rather than using email 
marketing to develop new customers and leads, where the costs usually outweigh the 
benefits, they use email to market to those who are already thought to be interested in 
the company’s products—existing customers, people who sign up for their mailing 
lists, customers of related businesses, and, most controversially, people whose 
browsing behavior or demographic profile indicates that they are likely to be receptive 
to the sender’s message. Someone who has bought items in the past from an online 
store, or booked hotel rooms with a chain, might get emails touting promotions, or 
other products the recipient might be interested in, or destinations she might enjoy. 
Someone who has bought items from one store might also get emails from that store’s 
corporate siblings. And someone who has given money to one organization or political 
campaign might get emails from other groups or campaigns that are ideologically or 
politically aligned.1 																																																								
1. This category consists of legitimate companies that send unsolicited commercial email, but many 
companies that send solicited commercial email—for instance, newsletter providers or companies that 
send periodic results in response to saved searches—also comply with the Act out of an abundance of 
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Congress’s decision to allow email marketing, while requiring senders to adhere 
to specific consumer protections, reflected a balance between two competing 
concerns: its desire that users have control over their email inboxes and its judgment 
that email could nevertheless be a legitimate part of a company’s marketing strategy. 
The latter concern required a federal law, since some states at the time were moving 
toward banning spam entirely. The Act preempted almost all state anti-spam laws, 
giving companies a uniform set of rules for email marketing—rules with which 
legitimate companies generally comply. 
The second group sending commercial emails consists of scammers who are 
unlikely to comply with the Act and the Rule regardless of their contents. This group 
likely sends the bulk of unsolicited commercial email. Some of these scammers are 
companies while others are individuals and loose groups of conspirators. These 
scammers hawk prescription drugs from online pharmacies, counterfeit watches, adult 
services, and all manner of scammy products and services. And unlike legitimate 
companies targeting existing customers and others likely to be interested in a 
company’s services, these scammers send as many emails as they can, switching 
servers and playing cat-and-mouse games with spam-blocking services to get their 
messages in front of users. 
Unlike with legitimate companies using email as part of their marketing 
strategies, there is no reason to think Congress intended these scammers to be able to 
operate legally, and for the most part they make no eﬀort to do so. Besides simply 
selling products that can be illegal (like illegal drugs, legal prescription drugs without a 
prescription, and all sorts of counterfeit goods), these emails often fail to include 
information required by the Act (like the name and mailing address of the sender), use 
false sender and header information to disguise their origins, and include false and 
deceptive content (often hidden when the email is seen by a user) to fool spam-
filtering software. These actions are both prohibited by the Act and by state laws that 
are carved out of the Act’s preemption clause; they also likely violate other laws, like 
various consumer-protection laws and the prohibition on wire fraud. 
																																																								
caution. These companies can be especially hard hit when companies violate the Act with impunity, 
since the result is more email users relying on technological filtering, and it can be diﬃcult for spam-
filtering algorithms to diﬀerentiate between solicited and unsolicited email. 
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This two-part nature of the email ecosystem stems from the basic structure of 
the technologies upon which email is built, which require no authentication of senders 
and give users little ability to decide who can email them.2 This structure has its 
origins in design decisions made decades ago in contexts that were strikingly diﬀerent 
from those in which email is used today. Email is not a symmetric, negotiated 
transaction, where a sender and a recipient must come to an agreement before a 
message can be transmitted. Instead, under the commonly used SMTP, POP, and 
IMAP protocols, a sender can unilaterally send an email, which a recipient’s mail 
server will receive and, usually, place in the recipient’s inbox. Developers have 
created various authentication and filtering technologies, grafted on top of these 
protocols, but these tools are not universally adopted and they work imperfectly at 
best. This has two important consequences: it means that there is no technical 
impediment to sending spam, and it makes it diﬃcult or impossible to track down 
senders of spam messages. 
Since these two kinds of unsolicited commercial email, and their senders, are so 
diﬀerent, they require diﬀerent legal responses, as discussed below. 
With respect to email from legitimate companies, the Act 
has provided substantial consumer benefits, though updates 
are needed. 
In reviewing the CAN-SPAM Rule, the Commission should recognize that when 
it comes to email from legitimate companies, the Act and its implementing Rule have 
provided substantial consumer benefits that should be maintained. At the same time, 
updates are needed to strengthen those benefits and respond to changes in the market 
for email marketing and in online technologies. 
																																																								
2. The Commission recognized this problem in its June 2004 report to Congress on a national 
“do-not-email” registry, which recommended against implementing such a system. See infra page 9. 
The Commission expressed concern that without server-level authentication of email senders, such a 
registry could be used by spammers to verify email addresses for targeting, and suggested creating a 
registry only after the market moved to an authentication-based email system. FTC, National Do Not 
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The principal consumer benefit of the Act and Rule has been to give email users a 
degree of legal control over their inboxes, which is critical because they have no 
similar technological control. These legal controls have been the major tool allowing 
people to control how companies can use their inboxes for marketing. Without those 
controls, companies can send marketing emails, clogging up recipients’ inboxes and 
using their resources—in time, network traﬃc, data storage, and so forth—without 
permission and without any obligation to stop, ever. Email before the Act was not an 
opt-in or an opt-out system; it was a no-choices-at-all system, unless an email sender 
chose for its own business reasons to oﬀer users the ability to remove themselves from 
the sender’s list. Under the Act, in contrast, senders must oﬀer recipients the ability 
to opt out of receiving emails; must disclose their names and addresses; and must label 
emails containing adult content. The Act also prohibits various methods used by 
spammers to build email lists and evade detection, though few legitimate companies 
would be likely to use such methods even if they were legal. 
The Commission should build on these protections so that the benefits they have 
provided consumers remain strong. Specifically, the Commission should take three 
actions, consistent with the Act, to protect consumer choice and further Congress’s 
goals in enacting the Act. 
Clarify the opt-out requirement. First, the Commission should use its rulemaking 
authority under section 13 of the Act to clarify the Act’s requirement that email 
senders provide a “clearly and conspicuously displayed” mechanism to opt out of 
future messages.3 This requirement should be updated in two ways: by imposing type-
size and visibility requirements for unsubscribe links and by mandating a standardized 
opt-out mechanism that can be invoked by a user’s email client software. Type-size 
and visibility requirements are necessary because although legitimate senders have 
largely honored the Act’s requirement that they provide opt-out mechanisms, many 
have honored in the breach the requirement that those mechanisms be “clearly and 
conspicuously displayed.” Instead, senders routinely bury unsubscribe links in lengthy 
fine print at the bottom of an email, in grey type on slightly lighter grey backgrounds. 
For example, these screen shots show how senders typically bury opt-out instructions: 
																																																								
3. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(3)(A). 
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In none of these emails is the mechanism to opt out of future emails “clearly and 
conspicuously displayed.” 
To remedy this problem, the Commission should require senders to include a 
standardized box containing information on how to unsubscribe, at the bottom of each 
email, akin to other standardized labels for food, drugs, and cigarettes. For instance, 
such a box could look like this: 
CAN-SPAM Information 
This email was sent to bill.smith@email.com by 
XYZ Inc., 123 Main St., Chicago IL 60601. 
To unsubscribe from this mailing list, click here. 
To stop all emails from this sender, click here. 
Besides being clearer and more conspicuous than the current plethora of hidden 
unsubscribe links, a standardized box would save time and help email users better 
express their preferences, since users would come to recognize and know how to use 
the standard box instead of having to search for each email’s distinct unsubscribe 
instructions. 
Besides simplifying the opt-out process for users, a standardized opt-out 
mechanism would also be more likely to work reliably, which would help solve the all-
too-common situation in which an email’s opt-out mechanism fails to work, thanks to 
server-side errors or other (intentional or unintentional) bugs. For instance, I recently 
received this internally contradictory message when opting out of email from a sender 
that started sending me email without any existing commercial relationship: 
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Moreover, mandating a standardized opt-out mechanism that can be invoked by 
software would allow consumers to use third-party tools to manage their email 
accounts in one place, rather than going message by message to opt out. There is a 
clear market demand for such tools. For instance, email clients from companies like 
Apple and Google have started oﬀering users the ability to unsubscribe from a mailing 
list with one click, as shown below: 
 
But this functionality depends on companies figuring out how to parse, and invoke, 
diﬀerent email senders’ diﬀerent unsubscribe options. If one sender’s option sends 
users to a webpage to unsubscribe, and requires them to check a box or hit a specific 
button to do so, the program must figure that out; if another requires typing in one’s 
email address, it must do that instead. And because these opt-out mechanisms are not 
standardized, programmatic options are inherently unreliable and likely to be 
implemented only by a few companies. A standard opt-out mechanism that could be 
invoked without error or uncertainty, in contrast, would lead to a more competitive 
market for email software, giving customers better choices about how to manage their 
inboxes. 
Reconsider creating a “do-not-email” registry. Second, the Commission should 
reconsider its previous decision declining to create a “do-not-email” registry pursuant 
to Section 9 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7708. 
The Commission elected not to create such a registry in 2004, reasoning that 
email’s lack of any server-level authentication meant that a registry could be 
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counterproductive because “spammers would most likely use a Registry as a 
mechanism for verifying the validity of email addresses and, without authentication, 
the Commission would be largely powerless to identify those responsible for misusing 
the Registry.”4 The Commission instead decided to encourage and wait for the 
widespread adoption of email systems with built-in authentication.5 Since that time, 
progress has been made on server-level authentication through tools like DKIM and 
SPF authentication, which are used by large email providers to verify sender domains. 
Although those tools have not yet been widely enough adopted to end the need to 
accept unauthenticated email, they are used by providers like Google, Yahoo, and 
Microsoft that provide email service to millions of users. The adoption of such tools 
would help resolve the issues that led the Commission to decline to create a “do-not-
email” registry in 2004. Given this change in technology, then, the Commission 
should reexamine its decision not to create a registry, since doing so would provide 
substantial value and since the downsides emphasized by the Commission are likely to 
decline or to be overstated. 
A “do-not-email” registry would enhance consumer welfare by making it easier 
for email users to give eﬀect to their email preferences. The Act gives users the ability 
to choose whether to receive email from a commercial sender, but making that choice 
requires an individual sequence of steps for each sender—steps that are often specific 
to each sender. An email user who wants to receive as little email as possible, then, has 
to unsubscribe to email from each individual sender, which can take a substantial 
amount of time and eﬀort. A registry, in contrast, would let a user indicate this 
preference once, not over and over. This time savings is exactly why Congress 
directed the Commission to create a National Do Not Call Registry, and it is equally 
applicable to email. 
The Commission concluded that the benefits of a registry were outweighed by 
the risk that spammers would use it to verify email addresses and target them for more 
email. In addition to the growth of authentication systems, though, other modern 
technical tools mean that that risk is avoidable. Rather than hand over the contents of 
a registry, the Commission could require companies to submit email addresses that 
have been processed by a cryptographic hash function like the MD5 or SHA-2 																																																								
4. FTC, National Do Not Email Registry: A Report To Congress, supra, at i. 
5. Id. at ii. 
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algorithm. A cryptographic hash function takes an input, like an email address, and 
generates a fixed-length value that cannot feasibly be converted back into the input; 
tech companies routinely use such hashes in applications like verifying user 
passwords. My email address, roger.ford@law.unh.edu, for example, generates the 
MD5 hash value 76905da1ac54406ddbf38acf85eadbf3. A company that wanted to a 
“do-not-email” registry could hash each email address on its mailing list, compare 
them to the hashes provided by the registry, and remove any matches from its mailing 
list. And the nature of the algorithm means that a spammer could not go the other 
way: given a hash value, one cannot feasibly obtain email addresses to spam. If a 
spammer generated a list of possible email addresses, it would be possible to verify 
which of those addresses were on the list, but doing so wouldn’t be any more useful 
than just emailing every possible address in the first place. 
Cryptographic hashes are just an example; the point is that there are technical 
solutions to the problems the Commission identified in 2004. The Commission should 
consider, then, ways to provide the value of a “do-not-email” registry while 
overcoming the problems that stopped it more than a decade ago. 
Provide preemption guidance. Third, the Commission should provide guidance to 
states and others on the scope of the Act’s preemption provision. The Act preempts 
most, but not all, state spam laws: it supersedes any state or local law that “expressly 
regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial messages, except to the extent 
that [the state or local law] prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a 
commercial electronic mail message or information attached thereto.”6 This provision 
preempts, then, state laws that would prohibit all unsolicited commercial email. It 
nevertheless leaves important openings for states to have a role combatting the spam 
problem—openings that have been underappreciated. 
There are two key roles states could play that would rely on the preemption 
clause’s exceptions. First, states could enact laws prohibiting falsity or deception in 
commercial emails: in the subject line or contents of the message, or in its routing 
information and from address. Many such emails will already violate the Act, but not 
all will do so, since the Act prohibits forged headers and deceptive subject lines but 
																																																								
6. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1). 
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not other forms of deception.7 States, then, could play a useful gap-filling role in 
prohibiting other kinds of falsity or deception, like in the contents of commercial 
emails. And second, states could provide for penalties and enforcement mechanisms 
that go beyond those in the Act. The Act’s enforcement provisions are limited: the 
Commission, state agencies and attorneys general, and ISPs can bring civil actions;8 
there is also a narrow criminal provision.9 Most violations of the Act, though, are not 
crimes, and recipients of emails that violate the Act have no recourse. States could 
overcome these limitations by providing for criminal penalties and private rights of 
action for email recipients. Without assurance from the Commission that states have 
that authority, though, they are less likely to become involved in an area where the 
federal government appears to have occupied the waterfront. 
With respect to email from scammers, the Commission 
should do more. 
When it comes to the second category of spam email—that from scammers who 
are unlikely to comply with the Act and the Rule in any circumstance—the 
Commission should recognize that the Act is unlikely to have a significant eﬀect, and 
so look for other ways to exercise its authority to help reduce the spam problem. 
The most significant thing the Commission could do to combat spam might be to 
facilitate the widespread adoption of authenticated email standards. This is an option 
the Commission contemplated in its 2004 report, but has not undertaken. In that 
report, the Commission contemplated such a standard as facilitating the creation of a 
“do-not-email” registry, but it would also directly reduce spam, since it would both 
facilitate technological solutions like filtering and facilitate enforcement actions under 
existing law like the Act. 
In its 2004 report, the Commission observed that “[t]he private market is already 
moving toward creating systems for authenticating that an email message actually 
comes from a mail server operated by the second-level domain appearing in the 
																																																								
7. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7704(a)(1)–(2), 7705. 
8. 15 U.S.C. § 7706. 
9. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(d).  
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message.”10 Though the Commission was right that authentication would become 
more common, in the 13 years since, the market has not embraced mandatory 
authentication, and it is time for the Commission to consider how its “support may 
help accelerate the pace” of adoption.11 Although mandating adoption of specific 
technical protocols is not likely to be the best approach, the Commission has other 
tools in its toolkit, including standards certification, encouragement of large ISPs 
through tools like industry summits, and its unfair-trade-practice authority under the 
FTC Act. Indeed, the Commission has made laudable use of that authority to 
encourage adoption of industry-standard security measures; insecure email is one of 
the largest security risks today for most computer users. 
The Commission could also take meaningful action against scam emails by 
sponsoring a Spam Challenge along the lines of its successful Robocall Challenge and 
subsequent challenges, which developed new technical tools to fight robocalls. The 
market has developed robust anti-spam tools like filtering, but those tools suﬀer from 
inherent limitations due to the decentralized nature of email services, HTML and 
JavaScript obfuscation, and other limitations that make it hard to reliably sort spam 
and non-spam emails. The Commission is well positioned to bring stakeholders and 
technologists together to find and develop new techniques and tools both for filtering 
messages that violate the Act and for preventing such emails from being sent in the 
first place. 
Finally, the Commission could look for ways to use payment processors and 
other critical intermediaries to reduce the amount of illegal spam sent. This could take 
several forms. The Commission could work with intermediaries to discover and shut 
down accounts belonging to spammers; or, if intermediaries are not cooperative, it 
could prioritize enforcement actions against those parties. These steps could prove 
eﬀective because illegal spam is a commercial enterprise just like legal spam: it doesn’t 
work if there isn’t some way to make money from the eﬀort. So payment processors 
and other intermediaries provide crucial links between senders, who seek to sell goods 
and services, and recipients, who seek to pay for those goods and services. 
																																																								
10. FTC, National Do Not Email Registry: A Report To Congress, supra, at 35. 
11. Id. 
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*   *   *   *   * 
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the Commission’s review of the 
CAN-SPAM Rule. This review is an important opportunity to build on the substantial 
consumer benefits the Act and Rule have provided while adjusting them to take 
account of the eﬀects of a decade and a half of evolving technology. By building on 
what has worked and trying something new where the Act and Rule have not worked, 
the Commission can continue to fight illegal spam while giving consumers tools to 
protect their own privacy and control of their email inboxes. 
Sincerely yours, 
/s/ 
Roger Allan Ford 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of New Hampshire 
 
